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A Territorial Approach to Representation for Illegal Aliens 
The decennial census determines each state's population for the 
purpose of apportioning seats in the House of Representatives. 1 Be-
cause the Census Bureau counts illegal aliens along with all other 
"persons,"2 states with significant illegal alien3 populations will en-
joy greater representation in relation to registered voters or legal in-
habitants than will states without such alien populations. This Note 
addresses the issue of whether the Constitution permits, requires, or 
leaves to congressional discretion the inclusion of undocumented 
aliens in the "persons" counted to apportion representatives among 
the states. 
While this issue is not new,4 recent efforts to alter the apportion-
ment of representatives to reflect population exclusive of undocu-
mented aliens have renewed constitutional scrutiny of the proposed 
I. "Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their re• 
spective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not 
taxed." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. The census figures also are used to allocate votes in the 
Electoral College, and to appropriate federal funds. See U.S. CONST. art. II,§ I, cl. 2; Note, 
Numbers that Count: The Law and Policy of Population Statistics Used in Formula Gran/ A/lo• 
cation Programs, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 229 (1980). 
2. Census Bureau procedures are dictated by statute, 13 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1976). Section 
14l(b) contemplates counting all persons: 
The tabulation of total population by States under subsection (a) of this section as required 
far the apportionment of Representatives in Congress among the several States shall be com• 
pleted within 9 months after the census date and reported by the Secretary to the Presi-
dent of the United States 
13 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1976) (emphasis added). The only persons presently not counted by design 
are diplomats and foreign tourists. The former reside on embassy grounds which are consid-
ered foreign soil and, therefore, not part of any state; the latter do not reside here at all. Feder• 
ation for Am. Immigration Reform (FAIR) v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564,567 (D.D.C. 1980). 
3. The term ''undocumented alien" is more accurate than "illegal alien" in that it describes 
either those who have entered the country without proper documentation or those who have 
remained in the country beyond the expiration date of their immigration documents. As used 
in this Note, illegal alien means an undocumented alien. 
4. In 1940, when Congress was amending an act that provided for the fifteenth and subse-
quent decennial censuses, the issue of counting resident aliens was raised and argued on the 
floor. See 86 CONG. REc. 4366-85 (1940). The discussion was aimed at documented aliens. 
Representatives then seemed to accept the argument that aliens as persons could not be ex-
cluded without a constitutional amendment. Consider the remarks of Representative Celler of 
New York: 
The Constitution says that all persons shall be counted. I cannot quarrel with the found-
ing fathers. They said that all should be counted. We count the convicts who are just as 
dangerous and just as bad as the Communists or the Nazis, as those aliens here illegally, 
and I would not come here and have the temerity to say that the convicts shall be ex-
cluded, if the founding fathers say they shall be included. The only way we can exclude 
them would be to pass a constitutional amendment. 
Id. at 4372 (Rep. Cellar). See also id. at 4367 (Rep. Warren). 
The statute under consideration, originally passed in 1929, provided for the census and for 
automatic reapportionment in the event that Congress did not act within a specified time. The 
President was to transmit the census results. The twentieth amendment, enacted in 1933, al-
tered the date for Congress's second session and advanced the inauguration of the President, 
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changes. Recently Congress specifically discussed counting illegal 
aliens,5 and opponents of their exclusion again argued that such a 
policy would violate the Constitution.6 The courts as well as the leg-
islature ha,ve confronted this issue of including illegal aliens in the 
census.7 The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) 
brought suit to enjoin the Census Bureau from including, without 
adjustment, illegal aliens in the population figures. 8 Although dis-
missed for lack of standing, the action raises some interesting consti-
tutional questions on the merits. 
FAIR raised two principal arguments to support its claim that 
allocating representatives on the basis of census data that count ille-
gal aliens violates the Constitution. First, FAIR contended that the 
rendering the time limits of the 1929 act no longer workable. The primary purpose of the new 
bill therefore was to amend the act to conform with the new congressional schedule. 
The House Committee had included a provision excluding aliens from the population 
totals. The bill in this form passed in the Senate; yet the House version did not include this 
provision. Id. at 4367. The discussion about aliens was prompted by the missing provision. 
The bill was passed with no reference to aliens. Id. at 4386. 
From 1929 to 1947, various members of both the House and Senate introduced what ap-
pears to have been the same constitutional amendment, which would have provided for appor-
tionment based on citizen population. See, e.g., 62 CONG. REc. 490 (1929); 67 CONG. REc. 
455 (1925); 71 CONG. REc. 33 (1929); 75 CONG. REc. 2453-54 (1932); 78 CONG. REc. 6637-41 
(1934); 84 CONG. REC. 1003 (1939); 87 CONG. REc. 465 (1941); 93 CONG. REc. 718 (1947) 
(Rep. Capper claiming he had been trying for 25 years to get the amendment submitted to the 
states). Each time the amendment was referred to committee; it was never voted on. After 
1947 interest in the amendment seems to have disappeared. 
5. See 126 CoNG. REc. H7263-72 (daily ed. Aug. 20, 1980). The debate concerned the 
McDade amendment which sought to block the funds needed to certify the census figures and 
transfer them to the President. Id. at H7263. Representative McDade was a plaintiff in FAIR 
v. K{utznick, id. at H7264, and his amendment was aimed indirectly at the illegal alien issue. 
6. Id. at H7266 (Rep. Garcia), H7269 (Rep. Leach), H7271 (Rep. Clinger). Rep. McDade, 
however, believed that a constitutional amendment was unnecessary. Id. at H7266. The Mc-
Dade amendment passed in the House on August 20, 1981, 222 votes to 189. The bill was 
ineffective in keeping the census figures from being transmitted. Since the McDade Amend-
ment says nothing about illegal aliens, it is hard to regard it as a definitive expression of con-
gressional interpretation of the census clause. There is also a good argument that the McDade 
Amendment itself was unconstitutional because it sought to delay the census beyond the ten-
year period required in article I, section 2. 
Earlier in the year, five separate bills requiring that the census exclude illegal aliens were 
introduced. See 126 CONG. REc. HI 199 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1980) (H.R. 6577 by Rep. Jeffords), 
S1976 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1980) (S. 2366 by Senators Huddleston and Heinz), HL549 (daily ed. 
Mar. 4, 1980) (H. Res. 594 by Rep. Clinger), H1766, Hl782 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1980) (H.R. 
6769 by Rep. Hillis), Hl898 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1980) (H.R. 6812 by Rep. Grassley). None of 
the bills were voted on. 
7. Federation for American Immigration Reform v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C.) 
(three-judge court), appeal dismissed, 447 U.S. 916, ajfd by judgment, No. 80-1246 (D.C. Cir. 
Nov. 6, 1980), cert. denied sub nom. Federation for American Immigration Reform v. Bal-
dridge (sic), 101 S. Ct. 1697 (1981) (hereinafter FAIR v. Klutznick). 
8. The short census form, which was to be sent to 80% of households, included no ques-
tions about citizenship. The long form, which was to be sent to the remaining households, 
included questions about citizenship but did not provide a means of differentiating docu-
mented from undocumented aliens. 486 F. Supp. at 567 n.4. FAIR also argued that the Bu-
reau, in an effort to increase the probability of counting the entire population, had actively 
encouraged illegal aliens to respond to the census. 486 F. Supp. at 567 n.S. 
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introductory phrase in the original article I, section 2, "People of the 
Several States," refers to lawful residents only.9 FAIR reasoned that 
because the United States did not adopt its first immigration law un-
til 1875, seven years after the adoption of the fourteenth amend-
ment,10 the framers of both the original and amended census clauses 
could have had no intent regarding illegal aliens. 11 The census 
clause, therefore, does not prevent the courts from interpreting it to 
exclude the illegal alien population. 
Second, FAIR argued that the "one person, one vote" 12 standard 
applied by the Supreme Court to intrastate congressional districting 
requires exclusion of illegal aliens. FAIR claimed that three to eight 
million illegal aliens, 13 concentrated in a few states, would cause a 
disproportionate allotment of representatives to those states. 14 This 
would dilute the voting power of citizens in states without a signifi-
cant illegal population, and cause those citizens to "receive a lesser 
share" of federal funds. 15 This result, FAIR contended, would con-
travene the "one person, one vote" standard set by the Supreme 
Court. 
This Note rejects these arguments in favor of the thesis that the 
census clause affirmatively requires including illegal aliens in the 
census figures used to apportion representatives among the states. 
Part I argues that the framers intended to allocate representation 
among the states based on a number of considerations, including 
wealth, and chose total population within the territory of each state 
as the best measure of those considerations. Part II contends that the 
requirement of individual equality in voting rights does not apply to 
interstate comparisons of voting power. Rather, a specific structural 
agreement reached by the states as sovereign entities governs the al-
location of representation among them. Part III argues that while 
the question of counting illegal aliens in the census presents numer-
ous technical and political issues subject to congressional discretion, 
9. Brief for Appellants at 18, 20, FAIR v. K.lutznick, No. 80-1246 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (copy on 
file with The Michigan Law Review). 
10. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (1875). See M. KONVITZ, THE ALIEN AND 
THE AsIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW 1-2 (1946). 
11. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 9, at 18-20. 
12. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964). 
13. 486 F. Supp. at 567. The estimates of the illegal alien population in the past ten years 
range from 3.5 to 12 million. Recent Census Bureau estimates place the figure at less than 6 
million and probably as low as 3.5 million. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1980, at Al2, col. 4. In 
1974 the Immigration and Naturalization Service estimated that there were 6 to 12 million 
illegal aliens in the country. See Salinas & Torres, The Undocumented Mexican Alien, 13 
Hous. L. REv. 863, 866 (1976). In 1975, Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., Commissioner of the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service, wrote that the actual number was probably between 6 
and 8 million. See Chapman,A Look at Illegal Immigration: Causes and Impact on the United 
States, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 34, 35 (1975). 
14. 486 F. Supp. at 565-66. 
15. 486 F. Supp. at 586. See also note 1 supra. 
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the essential constitutional issues concern the interpretation of article 
I, section 2, especially the definition of "person." These issues ulti-
mately lie within the purview of the Supreme Court. 
I. THE MEANING OF THE CENSUS CLAUSE 
The conclusion that the census clause16 requires apportionment 
of representatives according to population data that include illegal 
aliens follows from the constitutional language, the light cast on its 
original intent by its structure and history, and by the reaffirmation 
of these considerations in the fourteenth amendment. These con-
cerns strongly suggest that the framers adopted a territorial, rather 
than popular, approach to representation in the Hous~ as well as the 
Senate. This territorial model implies that the states enjoy a consti-
tutional right to representation based on the number of "persons" -
illegal aliens included - within their borders. 
A. The Constitutional Language 
The language of the census clause provides a starting point for 
determining its meaning.17 This language "is not ambiguous"; 18 it 
requires "adding the whole Number of free Persons . . . ."19 illegal 
aliens, although "not a component of the population at the time the 
Constitution was adopted, . . . are clearly persons."20 
Any distinction between undocumented aliens and "persons" 
must depend upon the legal status of the former. Other distinctions 
lead to contradictions. If illegal aliens do not qualify as legal per-
sons, their transformation through naturalization into citizens, for 
example, can occur only if personhood, like citizenship, is a legal 
category rather than an inherent attribute. The contention that ille-
gal aliens exist wholly outside the law because their very presence 
violates the immigration laws21 offers such a legal distinction. illegal 
16. Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned amoni the several States 
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which 
shall be determined by adding the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound 
to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other 
Persons ••.• 
U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 2, cl 3. 
11. See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202 (1819) (Marshall. CJ.) 
("[A]lthough the spirit of an instrument, especially of a constitution, is to be respected not less 
than its letter, yet the spirit is to be collected chiefly from its words."). And while strict literal-
ism does not dominate accepted modes of constitutional analysis, even those who view the 
Constitution as a vehicle for the legal expression of contemporary values treat ''the text and 
original history as presumptively binding and limiting, but as neither a necessary nor sufficient 
condition for constitutional decisionmaking." Brest, The Misconceived Quest far the Original 
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204, 237 (1980) (footnote omitted). 
18. FAIR v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. at 576. 
19. See note 16, supra. 
20. FAIR v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. at 576. 
21. For this argument in the equal protection context, ~ Burrafato v. United States Dept. 
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aliens, according to this argument, enjoy precisely the same status 
under United States law as they would have had they remained in 
their country of origin, that is, no status at all. Litigants have raised 
this argument in various attempts to deny illegal aliens access to the 
courts and the protection of the law.22 
Three related objections render the outlaw approach unpersua-
sive. First, considerable authority has rejected this view in other 
contexts. The Supreme Court has repeatedly included aliens among 
the "persons" protected by the due process clause of the fifth and 
fourteenth amendments, 23 even when their presence is illegal. 24 
Lower federal courts have upheld the personhood of illegal aliens for 
both due process and equal protection purposes. In .Doe v. Plyler,25 
the court held that while violation of the immigration laws could 
give rise to some disabilities imposed by the federal government and 
that plaintiffs' status as aliens could support their exclusion from 
participation in governmental functions within the state, no prece-
dent permits the states to impose other disabilities based only on a 
violation of the immigration laws.26 In Williams v. Williams,27 a fed-
eral district court found no relationship between a violation of the 
immigration laws and a divorce action and held that denying an 
alien access to the divorce court based on undocumented status 
of State, 523 F.2d 554,551 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 910 (1976), and Hernandez v. 
Houston Ind. School Dist., 558 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), cited in Comment, 
Equal Protection and the Education of Undocumented Childrfn, 34 Sw. L.J. 1229, 1234 n.34 
(1981). See also Comment, The Legal Status of Undocumented Aliens: In Search of a Consis-
tent Theory, 16 Hous. L. REv. 667, 695-96 (1979) (comparing the outlaw approach of the 
Hemandez court with the analysis of Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978)), 
22. See Comment, The Legal Status of Undocumented Aliens, SUJJra note 21, at 670-71. 
23. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 
48-51 (1950); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886): 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citi-
zens. It says: 'Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the law.' These provisions are universal in their application to all persons within the 
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or nationality; 
and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. 
24. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896), holding that while Con-
gress may exclude and expel aliens at its discretion, and order their detention toward those 
ends, it cannot punish the crime of illegal entry without meeting the due process standards set 
by the fifth and sixth amendments. The Court declared: 
Applying this reasoning [of Yick WoJ to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, it must be 
concluded that all persons within the territory of the United State are entitled to the pro-
tection guaranteed by those amendments, and that even aliens shall not be held to answer 
for a capital or other infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand 
jury, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 
25. 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980). For discussion see note 29 i'!fra. 
26. 628 F.2d at 458. The court also pointed out that illegal entry is only a misdemeanor for 
the first commission. While this is irrelevant to the outlaw argument per se, it does demon-
strate how disproportionate the disability would be in relation to the offense, if the outlaw 
approach prevailed. 
27. 328 F. Supp. 1380 (D.V.I. 1971). 
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would violate constitutional guarantees of due process and . equal 
protection.28 While these decisions do not specifically concern the 
census clause, they strongly support including illegal aliens in any 
constitutional definition of personhood.29 
Second, the outlaw approach defies consistent application. Both 
the state and federal governments subject illegal aliens to their juris-
diction for purposes of imposing certain obligations, such as the duty 
to pay taxes or obey the criminal law. If justice requires treating like 
cases alike, 30 excluding illegal aliens from legal protections and ben-
efits constitutes a paradigm case of injustice, for such an arrange-
ment treats the same individual as a person for purposes of burdening 
him and as a nonperson for purposes of protecting him. 
Finally, and most profoundly, allowing the government to statu-
torily deny disfavored groups the status of persons would permit the 
evisceration-by-definition of the Constitution's most important pro-
tections of individual rights. Subjecting personhood, like citizenship, 
to changes in legal status would empower political majorities to de-
termine the scope of provisions that arose from the very fear of the 
abuse of majority power.31 Important as it is, a proper allocation of 
28. 328 F. Supp. at 1383. 
29. The Supreme Court will decide this term whether illegal aliens are entitled to equal 
protection under the Constitution. Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), and Boe v. 
Wright, 648 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1981), U.S. appeal pending sub nom. Texas v. Certain Named & 
Unnamed Noncitizen Children (No. 80-1934), were consolidated on appeal, 49 U.S.L.W. 3930 
(No. 80-1934 June 15, 1981), and oral argument heard on December 1, 1981. If the Court 
decides that illegal aliens are not covered under the equal protection clause, it will have ac-
cepted the outlaw argument in this context. Because the equal ,protection clause is phrased in 
terms of "persons," this would be an unfortunate result, one that would open the possibility of 
further exceptions to constitutional protection. For a discussion of "person" and its use in the 
Constitution, see A. BICKEL, Citizen or Person? What is not Granted Cannot be Taken Away, in 
THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 33 (1975). Even if the Court holds that illegal aliens are not 
persons under the equal protection clause, it will leave open the question of whether they 
should be counted as persons under the census clause. The considerations underlying the due 
process, equal protection, and census clauses are distinct and the concerns that would cause the 
Court to find against equal protection would not apply under the census clause. In particular, 
the inclusion of illegal aliens under the census clause would not affect their eligibility for gov-
ernment entitlement programs. 
As this Note went to press, the Supreme Court decided the case in favor of the alien chil-
dren. Plyler v. Doe, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1982, § I, at 15 col. l. Although the court divided 
by five votes to four, none of the justices appear to have opined that the equal protection clause 
does not apply to illegal aliens. Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan observed that 
"[w]hatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a 'person' in any ordinary 
sense of that term." Plyler v. Doe, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1982, § I, at 15 col. l. This result, of 
course, reinforces the argument made in the text. 
30. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 155-63 (1961). 
31. See A. BICKEL, supra note 29, at 53: 
A relationship between government and the governed that turns on citizenship can always 
be dissolved or denied. Citizenship is a legal construct, an abstraction, a theory. No 
matter what the safeguards, it is at best something given, and given to some and not to 
others, and it can be taken away. It has always been easier, it always will be easier, to 
think of someone as a noncitizen than to decide that he is a nonperson, which is the point 
of the JJred Scott case. Emphasis on citizenship as the tie that binds the individual to 
government and as the source of his rights leads to metaphysical thinking about politics 
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interstate representation does not merit such a risk. Consequently, 
the outlaw approach should be rejected in favor of the territorial 
modeP2 mandated by the plain language of the census clause. 
B. The Framers' Intent 
Analyzing the _intent behind the census clause clarifies whatever 
ambiguity may inhere in its language. Based on three major argu-
ments, this Note defends the view that the intent animating the cen-
sus clause strengthens the case for counting illegal aliens. First, the 
framers meant to allocate representation, in the House as well as the 
Senate, to the states rather than to the people as individuals. Second, 
the framers intended to apportion representatives among the states 
based on a combination of factors, prominently including wealth, 
and chose the number of persons within each state's territory as the 
measure - and not the source ~ of this political entitlement. Fi-
nally, illegal aliens measure a state's entitlement to representation as 
accurately as many other persons unquestionably within the ambit of 
the census clause. 
1. States or Persons? 
The framers conceived of representation, even in the House, as a 
function of federalism. The states, and not the individuals within 
them, constituted the polity to be represented. While the familiar 
view that the framers intended the Senate to represent the states and 
the House to represent the people does not wholly lack support,33 it 
and law, and more particularly to symmetrical thinking, to a search for reciprocity and 
symmetry and clarity of uncompromised rights and obligations, rationally ranged one 
next to and against the other. Such thinking bodes ill for the endurance of free, flexible, 
responsive, and stable institutions and of a balance between order and liberty. It is by 
such thinking, as in Rousseau's The Social Contract, that the claims of liberty may be 
readily translated into the postulates of oppression. 
32. illegal aliens would still be subject to deportation and other rights and disabilities 
would still be fashioned within Constitutional bounds. Resident aliens do not enjoy all of the 
privileges afforded citizens, see, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (upholding a federal 
statute denying resident aliens federal medical insurance benefits unless they met a residency 
requirement); Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (upholding a state statute excluding 
aliens from jobs as public school teachers). Similar and perhaps broader disabilities would be 
upheld for illegal aliens. 
The Court seems to provide different levels of protection under the fifth amendment and 
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment for resident aliens. For an explana-
tion of the treatment of aliens, see Karst, Foreword· Eljllal Citizens/tip Under tlte Fourteen/It 
Amendment, 91 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 1, 42-46 (1977), and Karst, The F!filt Amendment's Guarantee oj' 
Equal Protection, 55 N.C. L. REv. 541, 552-62 (1977). 
33. See, e.g., C. ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 193 (1966). This view relies 
somewhat on a statement to the Convention by Dr. Johnson: 
On the whole he [Dr. Johnson] thought that as in some respects the States are to be 
considered in their political capacity, and in others as districts of individual citizens, the 
two ideas embraced on different sides, instead of being opposed to each other, ought to be 
combined; that in one branch the people ought to be represented; in the other, the Stales. 
1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 461-62 (M. Farrand ed. 1937) (hereinafter 
cited as RECORDS). Madison includes several similar statements in THE FEDERALIST Nos. 39 
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fails to explain as well as the competing territorial model does the 
interstate conflict that gave rise to the Great Compromise, the fram-
ers' concern with representing wealth, or the discounted inclusion of 
the slaves in the population base of representation. 
The census clause emerged from a compromise between the com-
peting interests and philosophies of members of the Continental 
Congress.34 The primary conflict involved whether the states would 
be represented in the legislature equally or proportionately by size.35 
The large states, proponents of the Virginia Plan, advocated repre-
sentation in the legislature proportional to ''the Quotas of Contribu-
tion, or to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule 
may seem best in different cases."36 The small states, proponents of 
the New Jersey Plan, urged that each state be represented equally in 
the legislature, as provided under the Articles of Confederation. 37 
The Great Compromise established a bicameral legislature with the 
Senate providing an equal number of representatives for each state 
and the House providing a number of representatives for each state 
proportional to its size.38 
This history suggests that the framers fashioned the Great Com-
promise less to represent both the states and the people than to pro-
vide a mutually satisfactory system for representing the states. Had 
the delegates perceived the issue as one of ideology, le., whether the 
legislature should represent the people directly, a purely state-ori-
ented division of opinion probably would not have developed. The 
controversy, however, clearly split the large and small states.39 This 
historical foundation of the census clause in the competing interests 
oflarge and small states suggests a federal, rather than popular, view 
of representation in the intentions of the framers. 
at 254-55, 58 at 392, 63 at 431 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). In THE FEDERALIST No. 54, however, 
Madison presents a defense of the territorial approach, less as his own view than as that of the 
Convention. 
34. See A. KELLY & w. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION - ITS ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT (1976); C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF nm CONSTITUTION 294 (rev. ed. 1937); 
cf. A. McLAUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 141 (1961) (''The 
Constitution is sometimes called a bundle of compromises; it may be more justly called the 
product of adjustment."). 
35. See M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF TIIE CONSTITUTION OF·THE UNITED STATES 84, 
91, 96-105 (1913); C. ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 176 (1966). 
36. See l RECORDS, supra note 33, at 20. The Virginia Plan provided for a legislature with 
two chambers. The first chamber was ''to be elected by the people of the several states" and 
the second was to be chosen by the first using the nominations provided by state legislatures. 
Voting in both houses was to be proportional to population or "contribution." M. FARRAND, 
supra note 35, at 68-70. 
37. The New Jersey Plan was silent on the issue of representation but made its position 
clear by advocating amendments to the Articles of Confederation rather than a new plan of 
government. See 1 REcoRDs, supra note 33, at 242-45. 
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl l; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl 3. 
39. See note 35 supra. 
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The founders' concern for representing wealth further supports 
the federal model of representation.40 Gouverneur Morris, for ex-
ample, forthrightly declared his belief that because "property . . . 
was the main object of government, . . . it ought to be the measure 
of the influence of those who were to be affected" by it.41 Even Dr. 
William Johnson, who had urged that the House should represent 
the people, 42 expressed the belief that ''wealth and population were 
the true, equitable rule of representation."43 The framers solidified 
this relationship of wealth and representation by making population 
the measure of both representation and taxation.44 Thus each state 
would receive a number of representatives proportionate to its con-
tribution through direct taxation to the federal government. Few, if 
any, delegates quarreled with this arrangement; indeed, the framers 
viewed taxation and representation as substantially interdepen-
dent.45 While few delegates believed that wealth constituted the 
only basis of representation,46 the broad consensus approving a ma-
jor role for property in the allocation of representatives seriously 
weakens the view that the framers intended direct representation of 
40. Nowhere in the discussion as far as it is recorded, did anyone urge the representation 
of men as men. Be it remembered that was a new idea in the world, born only eleven 
years before, in London, and not yet familiar on this side of the ocean. There can be no 
shadow of question that populations were accepted as a measure of material interests -
landed, agricultural, industrial, commercial, in short, property. This appears in the quite 
arbitrary grant of representation proportionate to three fifths of the number of slaves. 
They were not to be represented because they were human beings; their owners were to be 
represented in the ratio of ownership of human property. Again, only taxed Indians were 
to be counted, for they alone of the red men had any property. Most convincing of all, 
"representatives and direct taxes" were coupled in the paragraph providing for apportion-
ment among the States "according to their respective numbers." 
In view of all this, it would seem indisputable that citizens and aliens were not as such 
in the minds of the men who wrote the Constitution nor of those who were delegates to 
the ratifying conventions. Our fathers meant to apportion the membership of the House 
on the basis of all who dwelt within the respective States. Property was the basis, not 
humanity. Such political philosophy might not prevail to-day were the Constitution to be 
written anew, but until the Constitution is changed, it must be construed as it was meant 
to be construed. 
R. LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PRINCIPLES 356-57 (1930). Even Madison admitted the legitimacy of 
the Convention's concern for representing property. See THE FEDERALIST No. 54 (J, 
Madison) 367-70 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) ("Government is instituted no less for protection of the 
property, than of the person of individuals. The one as well as the other, therefore may be 
considered as represented by those who are charged with the government.") 
41. 1 REcoRDS, supra note 33, at 533. 
Gouverneur Morris opposed population as the basis of representation because he felt it did 
not accurately reflect property, see l RECORDS, supra note 33, at 582. 
42. See l RECORDS, supra note 33, at 461-62 (Dr. Johnson). 
43. Id. at 593. 
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cL 3. 
:45, See THE FEDERALIST, No. 54 (J. Madison) 366-67 (J. Cooke ed. 1961); 1 RECORDS, 
supra note 33, at 562. 
46. See Rossum, Representation and Republican Government: Contemporary Court Varia-
tions on the Founders' Theme, 23 AM. J. JURIS. 88, 99 (1978). 
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the people. Rather, the founders viewed wealth as one of the factors 
that determined each state's entitlement to representation. 
The counting of three fifths of the number of slaves reinforces 
this conclusion. No one felt that slaves as such deserved representa-
tion,47 but the sectional interests raised by the slavery question and 
the accepted emphasis on representing wealth made it difficult to ar-
gue for their total exclusion. Northern delegates opposed counting 
the slaves because they feared that granting the South increased rep-
resentation by virtue of the slaves would serve only to encourage the 
institution.48 On the other hand, if the Union profited by taxing the 
wealth of the South, that wealth required measurement with con-
comitant representation for the contribution.49 The Convention ulti-
mately adopted the three-fifths formula, developed earlier in the 
Resolution of April 18, 1783, governing revenue, and accepted as the 
"federal ratio."50 
The theory that the framers intended the House to represent the 
people cannot, account for this history. If "the people" included 
slaves, the census clause would have made no exception for them. If 
slaves counted as partial persons,5 I this disability had to stem from 
47. Pierce Butler and Gen. Charles Pinckney, both of South Carolina, felt that blacks 
should be counted equally for representation. Butler argued that their labor contributed as 
much as that of freemen and that because the government "was instituted principally for the 
protection of property, and was itself to be supported by property," the slaves should be 
counted equally. See I RECORDS, supra.note 33, at 580-81. This proposal was defeated twice \ 
in two days by votes of seven to three and eight to two. Id. at 580-81, 596. 
Few delegates argued that the slaves should not be counted at all. Id. at 580-95. Mr. 
Morris did say that Pennsylvania would never accept representation for the slaves. Id. at 593. 
James Wilson suggested that the rule of representation be "expressed as to make the [slaves] 
indirectly only an ingredient in the rule, by saying that they should enter into the rule of 
taxation; and as representation was to be according to taxation, the end would be equally 
attained." Id. at 595. Northern hostility to the provision surfaced later in the Convention. 
See 2 RECORDS, supra note 33, at 220-23 (Rufus King); ROSSITER, supra note 35, at 267-68. 
48. See 2 REcoRDs, supra note 33, at 220-23; C. ROSSITER, supra note 35, at 267-68. Some 
of the framers feared that counting the slaves would encourage the southern states to further 
increase the slave population. The national government was precluded from regulating their 
importation until 1808. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
49. See 1 RECORDS, supra note 33, at 562. 
Mr. King had always expected that as the Southern States are the richest, they would 
not league themselves with the North unless some respect were paid to their superior 
wealth. If the latter expect those preferential distinctions in commerce & other advan-
tages which they will derive from the connection they must not expect to receive them 
without allowing some advantages in return. Eleven out of 13 of the States had agreed to 
consider Slaves in the apportionment of taxation; and taxation and Representation ought 
to go together. 
Id. (William Paterson's notes). See also 3 RECORDS, supra note 33, at 342-43 (William Da-
vie's remarks in the North Carolina Convention regarding the three-fifths formula). 
50. Farrand argues that little debate on the issue of counting slaves actually took place 
because of the connection to taxation and the accepted ratio. M. FARRAND, supra note 35, at 
108-09. But sees. LYND, CLASS CONFLICT, SLAVERY, AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITU-
TION 156-83 (1967). Lynd claims that slavery was the underlying cause of the sectionalism 
apparent in every aspect of the convention and that the three-fifths compromise was much 
more complex than Farrand asserts. 
51. See TuE FEDERALIST No. 54 (J. Madison) at 369 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
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their perceived racial inferiority or their condition of servitude. Yet 
the census clause plainly required counting free blacks and whites 
bound to service for a term of years. Only when viewed as a political 
compromise to the property interests of the southern states does the 
three-fifths compromise comport with the rest of the census clause. 
This view leaves little room for direct representation of the people.52 
2. Measuring the Rights of States to Representation 
If the framers intended to apportion representatives among the 
states, why did they provide that a state's representation would vary 
with the number of persons inhabiting its territory? The preceding 
analysis suggests that the founders chose population as the best prac-
tical measure of each state's entitlement to representation. Popula-
tion obviously satisfied the interests of the larger states in 
proportional representation. Population further appealed to the 
framers as the most practical measure of wealth available.53 Indeed, 
population may well have offered the only feasible method of mea-
suring wealth, 54 and the opposition to relying on population largely 
concerned its accuracy as a reflection of property.55 The Conven-
tion, moreover, made no attempt to ensure popular input into the 
selection of representatives. The founders put forward no national 
voting qualifications to supplant the widely varying state stan-
dards, 56 many of which included substantial property qualifica-
tions.57 This indifference to the manner by which the states chose 
representatives clearly implies that the framers viewed the census of 
52. Quite apart from questions about the basis of representation, it may be argued that 
discouraging illegal immigration justifies excluding illegal aliens from the census, in a manner 
analogous to the effort of the Northern states to discourage slavery through the three-fifths 
compromise. FAIR, for example, ordinarily concerns itself with immigration reform, not rep• 
resentation. Unlike the slavery case, however, individual states have little, if any, control over 
illegal immigration. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (federal interest in integrated 
scheme for registering aliens preempts state alien registration laws). While excluding this 
group from apportionment figures may reduce its desirability as an element in the population 
of a given state, the exclusion could influence immigration, if at all, only indirectly. 
53. See, e.g., I RECORDS, supra note 33, at 579, (''He [Mr. Mason] urged that numbers of 
inhabitants; though not always a precise standard of wealth was sufficiently so for every sub-
stantial purpose."), 587 ("Mr. Ghorum supported the propriety of establishing numbers as the 
rule. He said that in Massts. estimates had been taken in the different towns. . . and it had 
been found . . . that the most exact proportion prevailed between numbers & property."); A. 
DEGRAZIA, PUBLIC AND REPUBLIC 95 (1951); Rossum, supra note 46, at 100. 
54. See 3 REcoRDs, supra note 33, at 342 (Remarks of Mr. Davie in the North Carolina 
Convention). 
55. Gouverneur Morris opposed population as the basis of representation because he felt it 
did not accurately reflect property, see 1 RECORDS, supra note 33, at 582. One commentator 
has suggested that if the Framers could have foreseen the capability of the modem census 
organization, considerable debate would have arisen about ''the value of property over num-
bers." A. DEGRAZIA, supra note 53, at 100. 
56. See THE FEDERALIST No. 54 (J. Madison) at 369 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
51. See, e.g., H. GOSNELL, DEMOCRACY: THE THRESHOLD OF FREEDOM 36 (1948). 
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persons as no more than the measure - and not the locus - of each 
state's right to representation. 
3. Illegal Aliens as a Measure of the States' Rights to 
Representation 
This Note argues that the framers intended to measure a state's 
right to representation by the number of persons within its territory. 
Three considerations support the conclusion that illegal aliens fall 
within the category"ofpersons encompassed by this territorial view. 
First, insofar as population measures material sources of representa-
tion, illegal aliens fulfill the framers' intent to reflect wealth in the 
census that apportions representatives. To the extent that illegal 
aliens take jobs American workers will not accept, their presence sig-
nals a welfare gain for the state's economy.58 Insofar as illegal aliens 
compete with citizens in the labor market, the employed aliens con-
tribute more to the state's economy than the unemployed citizens 
they displace. Only if aliens drain state welfare budgets or send the 
vast bulk of their earnings out of the state would they fail to reflect 
the economic factors that the framers felt deserved representation. 
In all probability, neither phenomenon reaches sufficient proportions 
to negate the positive contributions of illegal aliens to local econo-
mies. 59 The accumulation of wealth and the payment of taxes, as 
58. ''The simplest and most abstract µ-uth about immigration - legal or otherwise - is 
that it increases the supply of available labor and therefore makes labor cheaper, product 
prices lower, and employment greater. In this simple view, immigration promotes profits, eco-
nomic growth, and general prosperity, with possibly excessive demands for social capital for-
mation (schools, hospitals, housing) the only cloud on this otherwise pleasing picture." Fogel, 
Illegal Aliens: Economic Aspects and Public Policy Alternatives, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 63, 67 
(1977). While Fogel goes on to disapprove of illegal immigration, at least during periods of 
high domestic unemployment, because of its tendency to displace disadvantaged members of 
the legal labor force, such distributional concerns have no relation to the Framers' desire to 
represent the states on the basis of their wealth. Even if illegal aliens displace significant num-
bers oflegal workers - a hotly debated issue - they contribute thereby to the gross product of 
the state. This suffices to bring them within the purpose of the census clause to measure a 
state's entitlement to representation based on wealth. 
59. "In the last few years, public and private studies have uniformly discredited the direct 
drain theory. Data strongly suggest that only one to four percent of undocumented Mexicans 
take advantage of public social services such as welfare, unemployment benefits, food stamps, 
AFDC benefits and the like; that eight to ten percent actually receive "free" medical services; 
that about seventy percent pay Social Security and income taxes; that the majority do not file 
for an income tax refund; that all contribute to sales taxes; and that at least some contribute to 
property taxes. In terms of tax dollars paid versus social services consumed, undocumented 
Mexicans are overwhelmingly in the black." Lopez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In 
Search of a Just Immigration Law and Policy, 28 UCLA L. REv. 615, 636-37 (1981) (footnotes 
omitted). While undocumented aliens surely send a significant portion of their earnings out of 
the United States, two considerations prevent this fact from eroding the utility of illegal aliens 
as indicators of a state's wealth. First, as a matter of economic theory, illegal aliens will find 
employment only on terms mutually beneficial to themselves and to an employer. The salary 
agreed upon increases the utility of both parties. Consequently, even if all the money paid to 
illegal aliens were sent to other countries, never to return, illegal aliens would still reflect a 
positive contribution to the wealth of the state, because the value of their services exceeds the 
value of their wages. Second, a significant portion of an illegal alien's income must be spent in 
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reflected by the measurement of population, constitute the attributes 
of a state that the framers meant to represent.60 
Second, the specific exceptions contained in the census clause for 
Indians not taxed and slaves support, by contrast, the case for count-
ing illegal aliens. That the framers felt compelled to modify the 
"persons" language to ensure special treatment for slaves - a class 
possessed of "no rights which the white man was bound to respect"61 
- suggests an extremely comprehensive reading of the persons in-
cluded. Surely illegal aliens, possessed of some legal rights, 62 reflect 
a state's entitlement to representation to a considerably greater 
degree. 
The exception for Indians not taxed makes this point still clearer. 
Legally, Indian tribes were "distinct political communities," analo-
gous to foreign nations, over which the states enjoyed no jurisdic-
tion. 63 The framers excepted Indians within these communities 
because the state had no power to tax Indians living outside the terri-
tory over which it exercised jurisdiction. The exclusion in the census 
clause reflects the territorial model of apportionment; those outside 
the state's jurisdiction do not increase its entitlement to 
representation. 
When an Indian left his tribe, however, he became subject to the 
state's jurisdiction and thus included in census counts relied on for 
apportioning representatives. 64 This result held even for an Indian 
who did not qualify as a citizen under the fourteenth amendment. 65 
the state, simply to provide for necessities in a market with a much higher real price scale than 
that of the market to which earnings are transmitted. Dollars spent in aliens' home countries, 
moreover, to a large extent eventually return as purchases of United States exports. 
60. See notes 40-46 and accompanying text,,ru_pra. 
61. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856). 
62. See notes 23-24, supra. 
63. See Elks v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 99-100 (1884): 
The Indian tribes, being within the territorial limits of the United States, were not, strictly 
speaking, foreign States; but they were alien nations, distinct political communities, with 
whom tlie United States might and habitually did deal, as they thought fit, either through 
treaties made by the President and Senate, or through acts of Congress in the ordinary 
forms of legislation. The members of those tribes owed immediate allegiance to their 
several tribes, and were not part of the people of the United States. . . . Indians and 
their property, exempt from taxation by treaty or statute of the United States, could not be 
taxed by any State. 
See also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I, 17 (1831) (opinion of Marshall, C.J.). 
64. See I 12 U.S. at 111. Under Nebraska law, as a resident, Elk was subject to taxation, 
was a member of the militia, and "he is counted in eve,y a_p_porlionmenl of representation in the 
legislature; the requirement of [Nebraska's] Constitution being, that 'the legislature shall ap-
portion the Senators and Representatives according to the number of inhabitants, excluding 
Indians not taxed and soldiers and officers of the United i,tates army.'" 112 U.S. at 11 I, 
quoting NEB. CONST. art. 3, § I (emphasis added). While this is the Nebraska Constitution, its 
similarity to the U.S. Constitution is obvious. In any event, Elk, being subject to state taxation, 
would also be counted for apportionment under the U.S. Constitution. 
65. Elk argued that he was covered under section I, which says, ''[a/II _persons born or 
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
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Thus, the legal status of an inhabitant does not affect his inclusion in 
the census, so long as he is subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the 
state. 
The final consideration suggesting the similarity of illegal aliens 
and the "persons" who measure a state's right to representation con-
cerns the treatment of legal aliens under the original census clause. 
The framers, as evidenced by the citizenship requirements for the 
president, senators, and representatives,66 were not unaware of dis-
tinctions between aliens and citizens. Many of them shared xeno-
phobic prejudices as strong as any prevalent today.67 Had the 
founders intended to exclude aliens from the census, they would 
have done so affirmatively. In fact, aliens were routinely counted in 
the census, and generally enjoyed considerably broader political 
rights than they do today.68 
By every test except legality, then, undocumented aliens conform 
to the criteria envisioned by the framers for inclusion in the census. 
While we will never know if the framers would have considered le-
gality relevant, much less essential, for inclusion in the census, that 
distinction by itself justifies excluding illegal aliens only when cou-
pled with the complete approval of the dangerous and implausible 
outlaw approach. 
C. The Fourteenth Amendment 
The principles underlying the census clause of the fourteenth 
amendment differ little from those underlying the original clause. 
The framers of the amendment remained primarily concerned with 
allocating representation among the states and the language chosen 
United States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ I (emphasis 
added). The majority interpreted the clause as conferring citizenship by birth or naturalization 
only. Since Indians born in tribes were not subject to United States jurisdiction at the time of 
their birth, they could not achieve citizenship in this way but had to comply with formal proce-
dures of naturalization dictated by particular treaty or statute. 112 U.S. at 103. Justice 
Harlan, dissenting, cited congressional debates in support of his view that the phrase, "and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof," was intended to confer citizenship on any Indian who left 
his tribe, regardless of treaty or naturalization procedures. 112 U.S. at 117-23. Congress con-
sidered adding "Indians not taxed" after "subject to the jurisdiction thereof' in the citizenship 
clause, but decided that the meaning might be confused, resulting in an exclusion of the poor, 
and that the language chosen would include Indians who had left the tribe anyway. 112 U.S. 
at 117-18. 
66. Representatives must have attained citizenship status at least seven years prior to being 
elected. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cL 2. Senators must have attained citizenship status at least 
nine years prior to election. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3. The President must be a naturally 
born citizen. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
61. See THE FOUNDERS OF THE REPUBLIC ON IMMIGRATION, NATURALIZATION, AND 
ALIENS (M. Grant & C. Davison eds. 1928) (collection of correspondence and writings on the 
subject of aliens). 
68. See Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right To Vote?, 15 MICH. L. 
REv. 1092, 1094 (1977). Rosberg points out that citizenship at that time was not a definition of 
voter and that in many situations aliens could vote while citizens could not. Id. 
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reflects the intent to include aliens. 69 
During the debates on the amendment, the thirty-ninth Congress 
actually considered whether to count citizens, persons, or voters.70 
Since political equality would replace the three-fifths ratio, it became 
apparent that the Civil War would result in increased representation 
for the South in the House.71 Northern Congressmen sought a 
formula for apportionment that would avoid this outcome.72 Ini-
tially, they proposed that the census count only "qualified elec-
tors."73 They rejected this idea when the New England states 
discovered that they would lose, and the Western territories gain, 
representation using voters as the basis for apportionment.74 A later 
version proposed counting citizens but provided that the freed slaves, 
if denied political rights, could be excluded from the figures deter-
mining the state's share of representatives.75 Eventually, Congress 
changed "citizens" in this version to "persons" due to fear that some 
of the large states with a number of aliens would reject the amend-
ment because it would decrease their representation.76 The provi-
sion enacted used ''whole number of persons" but added a clause 
that would enable Congress to reduce the representation for any 
69. See text at notes 33-52 supra, and at note 76 infra. 
10. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 353-59 (1866); James, The Framing oj' the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 31 ILL. STUD. Soc. Sci. 3, 21-23, 59-60 (1956). 
71. CONG. GLOBE, supra note 70, at 357; James, supra note 70 at 21-22. The estimates at 
the time were that the South would gain by at least fifteen representatives and the Republi-
cans, then in control, were concerned that the Democrats would gain a majority as a result of 
the South's increased representation. If the freed slaves were counted but not allowed to vote 
in the South, southern voters would have substantially more voting power than their northern 
counterparts. "To avoid this or prevent its adverse effect on the Republican party was a practi-
cal problem having nothing to do with doctrinaire concepts of universal suffrage." Id. at 22. 
72. James, supra note 70, at 21-22. 
73. Congress believed that the South would not allow the blacks to vote and that an 
enumeration based on voters would avoid the result of increased representation. If the South 
did allow the blacks the franchise, it was anticipated that they would vote Republican and the 
problem of losing power to the Democrats would be solved. Id. 













75. Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States 
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, counting 
the whole number of citizens of the United States; provided that whenever in any State 
civil or political rights or privileges shall be denied or abridged on account of race or 
color, all persons of such race or color shall be excluded from the basis of representation 
or taxation. 
Id. at 57 (footnote omitted). 
16. See CONG. GLOBE, supra note 70, at 359 (remarks of Mr. Conkling); James, supra note 
70, at 59. James also points out that some states allowed aliens to vote and the framers felt it 
necessary to include them in the provision. Id. at 195-96. 
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state denying the franchise to male citizens more than twenty-one 
years old. 77 
This history further supports the territorial model and renders 
less likely any constitutional purpose to represent the people in the 
House. The formula chosen emerged from a balancing of state, not 
individual, interests. The provision for excluding even citizens from 
the census to punish states for failing to extend the franchise rein-
forces this conclusion.78 And the specific intention to include aliens 
as persons strengthens the case for viewing illegal aliens as legitimate 
additions to a state's right to representation. 
The background of the original census clause and of the four-
teenth amendment suggests that the framers chose the word "per-
son" in each instance to include everyone within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States. Total population measured the rel-
ative wealth of the states and apportioned representation accord-
ingly. Given these purposes, little reason exists to believe that the 
framers would have excluded illegal aliens. As a group they contrib-
ute through labor and taxes and in this respect cannot be distin-
guished from those counted. As the framers concerned themselves 
primarily with allocating representation among the states based on 
contribution, illegal aliens would have provided as adequate a meas-
ure as anyone else. 
II. REPRESENTATION 
The first Part of this Note has argued that the language and in-
tent of the census clause compel counting illegal aliens in the decen-
nial census. Contemporary notions of equality in representation, 
however, might justify another interpretation, especially for those 
who find the census clause ambiguous in spite of the preceding anal-
ysis.79 The plaintiffs in FAIR v. Klutznick argued that inclusion of 
77. But when the ri~t to vote at any election . . . is denied . . · . or in any way abridged, 
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein 
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to 
the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 2. 
78. See note 77 supra. But see Saunders v. Wilkins, 152 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. 
denied, 328 U.S. 870 (1946), which says that the provision was never actually used to reduce 
representation. 
79. For an interesting article on constitutional interpretation, see Sandalow, Constitutional 
Interpretation, 19 MlcH. L. REv. 1033 (1981). Sandalow argues for a realistic view of interpre-
tation and against the idea of a "core" meaning or an answer derived from the framers' intent. 
The Constitution is read in light of contemporary values and it has been read "so that the 
circumstances and values of the present generation might be given expression in constitutional 
law." Id. at 1051. The limitation on interpretation derives from the fact that constitutional 
growth is incremental and in this respect the intent of the framers, language of the document, 
and history are all relevant to current inquiry. Id. at 1063, 1068-72. The past, however, pro-
vides only guidance - not the answer. Id. 
For other background on constitutional interpretation, see, e.g., DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); Hurst, The Role oJ History, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME 
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illegal aliens would contravene the Constitution's principle of "one 
person, one vote," by diluting the voting power of citizens in states 
without significant illegal populations.80 The Supreme Court has 
held that this principle applies to congressional districting within 
states under the mandate of article I, section 2, and to the apportion-
ment of state legislatures under the equ!ll protection clause of the 
fourteenth amendment.81 The contention that this principle requires 
excluding illegal aliens from the census depends on the subsidiary 
claims that it applies to interstate as well as intrastate apportion-
ment, and that illegal aliens do not belong in the category of persons 
entitled to political representation, and thus to the protection of the 
principle. While superficially plausible, neither claim survives close 
inspection. 
A. Interstate Application of "One Person, One Vote" 
In Wesberry v. Sanders, 82 the Supreme Court ruled that article I, 
section 2's provision that representatives be chosen "by the People of 
the several States" "means that as nearly as is practicable one man's 
vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as an-
other's."83 The Court reached this result over the vigorous dissent of 
Justice Harlan, who argued that the Constitution apportioned repre-
sentatives among the states and conferred on each state the right to 
select its representatives as it chooses. 84 Harlan pointed to the three-
.fifths compromise and the guarantee of at least one representative 
for each state as evidence that the framers did not intend to require 
that each representative represent approximately the same number 
of voters or inhabitants. The majority did not address these objec-
tions, but might have offered the distinction between interstate and 
LAW 55 (E. Cahn ed. 1954); Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502 (1964): Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradi-
tion, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769 (1971). 
80. See Brief for Appellants, FAIR v. Klutznick, supra note 9, at 16-18. 
81. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). The Wesberry Court relied on the language of 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. I ("The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members 
chosen every second year by the People of the several States."), For decisions applying the one 
person, one vote standard to state apportionment schemes, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 
(1964) and companion cases: WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); Maryland 
Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 
(1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of 
Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964). 
There has been a great deal written about the apportionment decisions. For a small sam• 
piing, see R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND Pou-
TICS (1968); w. ELLIOT, THE RISE OF GUARDIAN DEMOCRACY (1974); Auerbach, The 
Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote- One Vote, One Value, 1964 SUP. CT. Rav. I; 
Rossum, supra note 46; Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, the "Righi" to Vole, and the 
Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 33. 
82. 376 U.S. I (1964). 
83. 376 U.S. at 7-8. 
84. 376 U.S. at 20-50 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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intrastate apportionment to explain the inconsistency between the 
formula for allocating representatives among the states and the one 
person, one vote precept. 
The Court later held that the states could not adopt the system of 
representation adopted in the Great Compromise without violating 
this principle. In Reynolds v. Sims,85 the Court ruled that a legisla-
tive apportionment scheme providing for a geographic allocation of 
State Senators and a popular allocation of State Representatives vio-
lated the equal protection clause's guarantee of equality in voting 
power. Reynolds and its progeny make clear that unless some un-
identified distinction exists between the standard set by article I, sec-
tion 2, and that set by the fourteenth amendment, the federal system 
would fail the one person, one vote test if it applied. In the light of 
this failure, the Court's consistent distinction between the geographic 
allocation of representatives and senators required by the federal 
Constitution but forbidden to the states unmistakably indicates that 
the Wesberry and Reynolds test does not apply to interstate 
apportionment. 
This conclusion reflects the genesis of the federal system in a 
compromise agreed to by sovereign states.86 These "unique histori-
cal circumstances"87 justify a different approach to interstate appor-
tionment. The specificity with which the Constitution disdains the 
equal voting power principle - in the guarantee of one representa-
tive to each state, in the Senate, and in the Electoral College88 -
confirms that the distribution of representation among the states 
should conform to the principles of federalism over the principle of 
equality. Those principles require counting illegal aliens in the 
census.89 
B. Population as the Standard for Measuring Equality 
of Voting Power 
Assuming for the purposes of argument that the one person, one 
vote standard applies to interstate apportionment, inclusion of illegal 
aliens in the census would contravene it only if voters or citizens, 
rather than persons, measured the entitlement of a state to represen-
tation. A good deal of confusion, however, surrounds the question 
of whether representation under this standard should correspond to 
total population, number of citizens, or number of voters. This con-
fusion appears to result from imprecise and undifferentiated refer-
85. 377 U.S. 533, 571-77 (1964). 
86. 377 U.S. at 574-75. 
87. 377 U.S. at 574. 
88. See, e.g., 376 U.S. at 28-29 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (one representative per state); Gray 
v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 378 (1963) (Electoral College). 
89. See notes 33-52 and accompanying text, supra. 
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ences to the related but distinct concepts of citizenship, 
representation, and suffrage. The Court's opinion in Reynolds v. 
Sims offers an excellent example. The Court held that "t4e seats in 
both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on 
a population basis" because "an individual's right to vote for state 
legislators is unconstitutionally infringed when its weight is in a sub-
stantial fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens living 
in other parts of the State."90 The indiscriminate use of such terms 
as population, voters, and citizens creates significant ambiguity in 
the meaning of the one person, one vote epigram. 
The census clause does little to resolve this confusion because it 
speaks only of the very formal process of allocating representatives 
for a certain number of people. Theoretically, the representative 
represents each person counted, even those not entitled to vote.91 
The framers addressed only the issue of counting in article I, section 
2, and left regulation of voting entirely to the states.92 At that time 
significant distinctions separated the related concepts of citizenship, 
representation, and suffrage. Only a small portion of the population 
could vote,93 but the census counted everyone for the purpose of 
congressional representation.94 Citizenship did not guarantee suf-
frage,95 and states that required property ownership as a prerequisite 
to voting often did not require citizenship.96 Often, alien property 
owners enjoyed the franchise while certain citizens did not.97 
The obscurity of article I, section 2, and the Court's apportion-
ment decision leaves .some scope for the argument that members of 
Congress represent voters, rather than population. This view would 
require excluding illegal aliens from the census because including 
them would distort the equality of representation among voters. 
While no clear consensus has emerged concerning the role of the 
90. 377 U.S. at 568. 
91. This theory is referred to as virtual representation. Although rejected as practiced in 
England, the concept underlies much of what was done by the framers in the area of represen-
tation. See G. Woon, REPRESENTATION AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1969). 
92. It is a fundamental principle of the proposed Constitution, that the aggregate 
number of representatives allotted to the several States is to be determined by a federal 
rule, founded on the aggregate number of inhabitants, so the right of choosing this allot-
ted number in each state is to be exercised by such part of the inhabitants as the State 
itself may designate. 
THE FEDERALIST, No. 54 (J. Madison) 369 (J. Cook ed. 1961). See also notes 74, 76 supra. 
93. See H. GOSNELL, DEMOCRACY: THE THRESHOLD OF FREEDOM 36 (1948) (One half of 
the male population was disenfranchised by property qualifications and as a result it is esti-
mated that only three percent of the population voted in the first election under the 
Constitution). 
94. Everyone except those specifically excluded was counted. See text at notes 66-68 supra. 
95. See note 14supra (comparing citizen and voter population); Rosberg, supra note 68 (on 
voting rights of aliens). See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (granting women the vote). 
96. See Rosberg, supra note 68, at 1094. 
91. Id. at 1093-94. 
May 1982) Note - Representa~ion for Illegal Aliens 1361 
representative in the United States,98 support does exist for viewing 
voters and not people as the represented. The broad trend toward 
expanding the franchise99 directs attention to voting rather than citi-
zenship or population. By viewing the relationship between repre-
sentative and represented in delegate terms, the voter becomes the 
central figure. From this position it takes only a small step to equate 
representation with voting.100 Universal suffrage, designed to make 
the representative more accountable to the constituency, begins to 
dominate and color thinking about the constituency itself.101 Be-
cause only citizens may vote, citizenship in turn becomes an addi-
tional qualification for representation.102 The emphasis in the 
apportionment decisions on the right to vote and the right to have 
each vote counted equally casts doubt on the right of nonvoters to 
representation. 
Stronger arguments, however, support reliance on population as 
the baseline for measuring equality of voting power. First, the 
Court's decisions clearly indicate the constitutionality of the popula-
tion standard. The Court has held that for apportionment of state 
legislatures, the state, in resolving a political issue, enjoys the discre-
tion to rely on total population, citizen population, 103 or registered 
98. The thorough treatment of this topic would exceed the scope of this Note. See gener-
ally A. BIRCK, REPRESENTATION (1971); H. GOSNELL, supra note 93, at 124-42; H. PITKIN, 
THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967); REPRESENTATION (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 
1968). In Political Representation: An Overview, in REPRESENTATION, id. at 12-13, Pennock 
divides the trustee/delegate problem into four propositions: 
1. Representatives act in support of constituency desires. 
2. Representatives act in support of what they believe is in the best interest of the 
constituency. 
3. Representatives act in support of national desires. 
4. Representatives act in support of national interest. 
Pennock concludes that each theory operates at different times and that the representative is 
always balancing the various concerns. 
99. See U.S. CONST. amend XV (extending the franchise to black males); U.S. CONST. 
amend XIX (extending the franchise to women); U.S. CoNsT. amend. XXIV (eliminating the 
poll tax); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (lowering the voting age to eighteen). 
100. q: Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1963): 
But representative government is in essence self-government through the medium of 
elected representatives of the people, and each and every citizen has an inalienable right 
to full and effective participation in the political processes of his State's legislative bodies. 
Most citizens can achieve this participation only as qualified voters through the election of 
legislators to represent them. 
101. See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92-96 (1966); J. Ross, ELECTIONS AND ELEC-
TORS 101 (1955) (''Universal suffrage necessarily treats every elector as precisely equal to every 
other elector: it can take account neither of differences of ability nor of differences of need. 
Hence, with universal suffrage, no justification can be found for giving greater weight to one 
vote than to another. The logical and inescapable consequence of this is that the ratio between 
the number of electors and the number of elected should, within a given electoral system, be 
everywhere the same . . . ."). . 
· 102. All states require citizenship for voting. Arkansas was the last state to eliminate alien 
suffrage and did so in 1926. Rosberg, supra note 68, at 1100. 
103. See WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964). 
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voter population. 104 So long as the state does not use one of these 
standards to "perpetuate underrepresentation of groups constitution-
ally entitled to participate in the electoral process,"105 it may consti-
tutionally adopt any of them. The rationale for protecting only those 
entitled to participate suggests counting only voters or citizens, 106 but 
the Court explicitly held that the population standard fulfilled the 
one person, one vote criterion. 107 Moreover, in Kirkpatrick v. Preis-
ler, 108 the Court expressed its doubt that the Constitution permits 
federal congressional districting on any basis other than total popu-
lation. "There may be a question whether distribution of congres-
sional seats except according to total population can ever be 
permissible under Art. I, § 2."109 Given that article I, section 2, and 
not the fourteenth amendment, imposes the one person, one vote 
standard on apportionment of representatives, 110 reliance on total 
population is surely permitted and perhaps required by the 
Constitution. 
Second, any nonpopulation standard faces considerable difficulty 
in discovering a test to exclude illegal aliens without also excluding 
persons whom the census has always counted. illegal aliens may not 
vote, but neither may many other individuals who surely qualify as 
"persons." Examples include children, legal aliens, 111 and felons. 112 
If the nonpopulation standard seeks to count only those entitled to 
representation, difficulties persist. Children, if citizens, perhaps have 
some claim to representation because they may vote in the future. 
Felons, on the other hand, while citizens, have permanently lost the 
right to vote. Resident aliens are not citizens and may not vote, but 
the history of the fourteenth amendment clearly reveals the intention 
104. See Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 91-97 (1966). The Court in Burns v. Richard-
son sought to limit its holding, that registered voter population was acceptable, to the facts of 
that case. The Court said that the use of registered voters was permissible because the result-
ing apportionment was substantially the same as it would have been using citizen population. 
384 U.S. at 96-97. Citizens population figures were, however, unavailable and it is unclear 
how much leeway a state might have in showing that its system produced an apportionment 
that was substantially the same as it would be using citizen population. 
105. 384 U.S. at 92. 
106. See 384 U.S. at 73; cases cited in note 81 supra; note 102 supra. 
107. See 384 U.S. at 92; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
108. 394 U.S. 526 (1969). 
109. 394 U.S. at 534. J.nKirkpatrick, the Court expressly left open the question of whether 
a state could apportion its congressional districts using something other than total population. 
Even if states were allowed to use an alternate base in districting, under the present system 
they would still be allocated representatives based on the total population of the state. 
110. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
111. See note 102supra. 
112. By implication, the fourteenth amendment permits states to disenfranchise felons. 
See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (state constitutional and statutory provisions 
disenfranchising convicted felons are not inconsistent with equal protection); note 77, supra. 
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to include them. 113 Neither the right to participate, nor the right to 
representation, distinguishes illegal aliens from groups well within 
the ambit of the census clause. 
The only viable distinction between illegal aliens and groups 
such as felons and resident aliens concerns the illegality of their 
physical presence. This outlaw approach deserves no greater defer-
ence in the context of representation than it merits in interpreting the 
language of the census clause. If anything, the dangers of defining 
fundamental rights by reference to citizenship appear more clearly 
here, where reliance on such a standard would permit the govern-
ment to manipulate the political process by altering the definition of 
citizen. 
Several conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, plaintiffs 
like FAIR who seek to exclude illegal aliens from the census to avoid 
the dilution of their voting power should not prevail. The one per-
son, one vote principle does not apply to interstate apportionment. 
If it did, allocation of representatives based on total population, legal 
and illegal, is constitutionally invulnerable. Second, should Con-
gress act to change the basis of interstate apportionment the defend-
ers of such a plan could not justify its deviation from the language 
and intent of the census clause by raising equality of voting power as 
a competing constitutional principle. Because population-based ap-
portionment fully satisfies the equality principle, and the census 
clause speaks in terms of "persons" rather than citizens or voters, 
such a plan should not survive judicial scrutiny. 
This legal analysis may succeed in establishing that the Constitu-
tion does not forbid dilution of citizens' voting power by counting 
illegal aliens in the census. This, of itself, does little to dispel the 
doubts of those deeply committed to the contemporary egalitarian 
model of representation. Appeals to the intentions of the framers 
and the decisions of the courts do not address the normative beliefs 
behind that model. Yet the facts that counting illegal aliens may 
serve purposes of representation, such as the maintenance of federal-
ism, that extend beyond rigid adherence to the egalitarian formula, 
that counting other individuals such as resident aliens routinely 
leads to a similar distortion, and that the ultimate dilution will prove 
relatively minor, may successfully countervail these concerns even 
on the level of political theory. An opposite conclusion, in any 
event, ought to be incorporated into constitutional law by direct 
amendment rather than interpretation. While the Constitution may 
retain the capacity for organic growth in response to contemporary 
political values, a decision in tension if not at odds with the use of 
"persons" in the constitutional language and the framers' intent to 
represent the states seems beyond the scope of justifiable "growth." 
113. See text at note 76 supra. 
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To reach for such a result when contemporary views of representa-
tion are uncertain and perhaps inconsistent would give up some of 
the document's enduring stability in exchange for a doubtful conces-
sion to modem values. 
Ill. THE Locus OF DECISION 
This Note has advanced the thesis that the census clause requires 
including illegal aliens in the population count that governs the ap-
portionment of representatives. Before reaching such a decision on 
the merits, a court adjudicating any challenges to the operation of 
the census must also decide whether the issue admits of judicial reso-
lution. This Part argues that consideration of the practical difficul-
ties with counting illegal aliens, the judicial doctrines of standing 
and political questions, and the arguments for judicial review sup-
ports the conclusion that the courts should not hesitate to dispense 
justice on the merits. 
A. Practical Considerations 
A number of practical concerns bearing on the decision whether 
to count illegal aliens suggest that Congress should decide the ques-
tion. The most obvious question is whether the Census Bureau 
could exclude this population from the figures if instructed to do so. 
Given the enormous task of counting the population, it may be un-
reasonable to require that the Bureau refrain from counting a spe-
cific portion of the population, especially when that population is 
unwilling to identify itself. Beyond announcements that illegal 
aliens should not answer questionnaires, effective and workable pro-
cedures are hard to imagine.114 
FAIR suggested that the Census Bureau subtract estimates of the 
illegal alien population from total population figures. 115 The main 
problem with this solution is that there is no assurance that the total 
population counted includes all, or even most, of the illegal aliens. 116 
If it does not, then the Bureau would be subtracting from citizen 
population. The second problem is that estimates of the illegal alien 
population range from three to twelve million.117 In short, no one 
knows how many there are to subtract. 
114. See Note, supra note 1, at 265 ("The issue of whether to adjust data in ways not 
known to improve accuracy is peculiarly one for Congress."). 
115. See FAIR v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564, 575. 
116. For some of the problems with attempting to count illegal aliens separately, see FAIR 
v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. at 568. The same factors that would make separate counts for aliens 
and citizens problematic also operate on the Census as presently conducted. Illegal residents 
tend to shun any contact with government agents that might result in their discovery and 
deportation. Consequently, the Census probably undercounts the alien population to a very 
significant extent. 
117. See note 13 supra. 
May 1982] Note - Representation for Illegal Aliens 1365 
A more technical problem exists in determining the duration of 
undocumented status. There are a number of statutory provisions 
that make undocumented aliens meeting certain conditions ineligible 
for deportation. 118 More fundamentally, and more prevalently, 
many undocumented aliens simply are not deported.119 Absent 
some official determination of status, an undocumented alien pre-
sumably retains that status despite changing circumstances. Never-
theless, at some point the alien has become a permanent inhabitant. 
In this situation, illegal entry seems a poor reason for excluding such 
a person from the census. 
These practical problems are more properly within the purview 
of Congress, which can investigate the capabilities of the Census Bu-
reau and gather information from other appropriate sources. But the 
decision also involves interpreting the phrase ''whole number of per-
sons" used in the census clause. Congress is fully capable of inter-
preting the Constitution and, in this case as in countless others, must 
do so to carry out its functions. 120 Such a congressional determina-
tion, however, presents the question whether the Supreme Court 
should review this particular decision. 
B. Standing To Sue 
The availability of judicial review may tum on who brings suit. 
To establish standing in constitutional actions, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate, at- a minimum, "that he personally has suffered some 
actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal con-
duct," that the injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action," 
and that the injury "is likely to be redressed by a favorable deci-
sion."121 The rationale for the standing requirement concerns the 
vigor with which a plaintiff will litigate his suit.122 Fear that a plain-
tiff without the incentive of an actual injury will prosecute his action 
118. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(l) (1976) (Attorney General can suspend deportation of 
an alien, who has resided here seven years or more and is of good moral character, if deporta-
tion would result in hardship to him or to his spouse, parent, or child who are lawful resi-
dents); 8 U.S.C. § 1254(b) (1976) (Attorney General can suspend deportation for an alien who 
has served 24 months or more in active duty in the Armed Forces). 
119. See note 13 supra. 
120. Congress considered whether to count aliens from 1929 until 1947 and recently dis-
cussed counting illegal aliens. See notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text. The question con-
cerning illegal aliens has been temporarily settled by inaction but, in view of the vote in the 
House on the McDade Amendment, there appears to be substantial support for exclusion and 
the issue will undoubtedly be raised again. Congress then will confront once more the consti-
tutionality of any exclusion. 
121. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & 
State, Inc., 50 U.S.L.W. 4103, 4105 (1982) (citations omitted). 
122. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) ("Have the appellants alleged such a personal 
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens 
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult 
constitutional questions? This is the gist of the question of standing."). 
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indifferently, thus denying the court the benefits of the adversary 
process and creating res judicata difficulties for subsequent litigants, 
explains the doctrine, at least in part. 
Illegal aliens themselves have a poor claim to standing in a suit 
challenging congressional action to exclude them from the census. 123 
Organizations of individuals lack standing to oppose the current 
practice of counting illegal aliens on constitutional grounds. 124 But 
states that would lose representatives as a result of a congressional 
exclusion surely suffer sufficient injury to maintain the needed stand-
ing.125 Tracing the injury to the challenged action and redressing it 
through judicial action present few difficulties because both injury 
and remedy could be identified-with reference to the system cur-
rently in use. The factual demonstration that an exclusion would 
injure a state, and that a court could successfully enjoin an exclu-
sionary system in favor of the current practice, appears imminently 
feasible. With congressional seats and millions of dollars in funds at 
stake, states have strong incentives to defend their interests vigor-
ously. Consequently, both the formula and the rationale for the 
standing doctrine support recognizing the standing of states to sue to 
redress unconstitutional census procedures. 
C. Political Questions 
The political question doctrine, like that of standing to sue, pre-
serves the courts' option to evade an unpleasant issue. Conse-
quently, predicting whether the Court will decide an arguably 
"political question" on the merits defies analytic precision. Based on 
the standards for classifying a dispute as a political question, how-
ever, only a modest case can be made for deeming the exclusion of 
illegal aliens from the census outside the purview of the Court. 
In .Baker v. Carr, 126 Justice Brennan attempted to catalogue the 
concerns that had led the Court to decline to decide certain cases 
under the political question doctrine. 127 These concerns included the 
123. Because illegal aliens cannot vote, whatever injury they suffer as a result of exclusion 
from the census would be far more attenuated and speculative than that of the plaintiffs in 
FAIR v. Klutzmi:k. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and its progeny, recognized standing 
only for voters whose votes were demonstrably diluted by government policies. 
124. The plaintiffs in FAIR v. Klutznick lacked standing because they failed to prove in-
jury. The court held that because no particular plaintiff could prove that his own vote would 
be denigrated by including illegal aliens, a group of persons with characteristics like those of 
persons who might be injured lacked standing. 486 F. Supp. at 570-75. The court noted that 
the degree of injury did not bear on the standing question; even a minute dilution of a plain• 
tiff's vote would suffice to confer standing. But plaintiffs failed to establish with certainty that 
any of them would suffer such a dilution. 486 F. Supp. at 573. 
125. Loss of federal funds would not suffice, because such a result follows not from any 
decision as to how to conduct the census itself, but from the congressional decision to follow 
census data in allocating funds. 486 F. Supp. at 566 n.3, 569 n.9. 
126. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
127. Prior examples of political questions include Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) 
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textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; a lack of judicial standards for 
resolving the issue; the need for an extra-judicial policy determina-
tion to decide the question; whether the Court might decide the issue 
without expressing disrespect for the other branches of the govern-
ment; or an unusual need for the government to speak with one 
voice on the question presented. 128 Deciding the constitutionality of 
excluding illegal aliens from the census would not require applica-
tion of any standards other than the tools of constitutional interpre-
tation regularly relied on by the courts. Nor would the Court need 
to indulge any policy preferences other than those expressed in the 
Constitution. Some disrespect for the political departments of the 
government inheres in any exercise of judicial review. 129 The disre-
spect shown by a decision to invalidate the exclusion of illegal aliens 
is less than that in most cases because the Constitution, whatever its 
meaning, clearly controls the scope of the census. The meaning of 
(apportionment; formally overruled by Wesberry v. Sanders); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 
(1939) (validity of enactments, such as whether a constitutional amendment complies with the 
time limit set for its ratification, presents a political question); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 
How.) 1 (1849) (guarantee clause presents issues without manageable standards for judicial 
decision-making). 
128. 369 U.S. at 217. This functional approach has also been espoused by commentators. 
See Frank, Political Questions, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 36 (E. Cahn ed. 1954); 
Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 
566-97 (1966). Bickel would probably have agreed with the functional approach but he 
thought all decisions in the area were ultimately controlled by expediency. See Bickel, The 
Supreme Court 1960 Term - Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 46, 74-79 
(1961). Henkin's approach is also functional though he would discard the label of "political 
question" altogether. "Would not the part of the courts in our system, the institution of judi-
cial review, and their public and intellectual acceptance, fare better if we broke open that 
package, assigned its authentic components elsewhere, and threw the package away?" Henkin, 
Is There a "Political Question" .Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 625 (1976). 
129. This Note will not examine whether Congress or the Court should decide the question 
of counting illegal aliens within the broad framework of the pros and cons of judicial review 
per se. For an overview of the controversy, see W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-35 (5th ed. 1980), and sources cited therein. The broad issue of the 
propriety of judicial review is beyond the scope of this Note and for practical purposes an 
academic question: 
Whether the power of the Supreme Court "to outlaw as unconstitutional acts of elected 
officials or of officers controlled by elected officials" was intended by the Framers or 
granted by the Constitution is no longer the real issue. Rather as Dean Eugene V. Rostow 
has put it, the power of judicial review "has been exercised by the Court from the begin-
ning .... And it stands now, whatever the Founding Fathers may in fact have meant, as 
an integral feature of the living constitution, long since established as a working part of 
the democratic political life of the nation." "The weight of ... history is evidence that 
the people do expect the courts to interpret, declare, adapt, and apply these constitutional 
provisions, as one of their main protections against the possibility of abuse by Presidents 
and legislatures." 
Choper, On The Warren Court and Judicial Review, 17 CATH. U. AM. L. REv. 20, 37 (1967) 
(footnote omitted) (quoting Rostow, The .Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 193 (1952), and Rostow, The Supreme Court and the People's Will, 33 NOTRE DAME 
LAW. 573,576,590 (1958)). This Note will discuss the pros and cons of judicial review of this 
particular question within the framework of the political question doctrine and the elements 
that have, in the past, led the Court to decline to hear a case. 
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the Constitution, at least since Marbury v. Madison, has been "em-
phatically the province and duty of the judicial department." 130 
And, in the case of aliens and the census, Congress has repeatedly 
deferred to the fear that an exclusion would contravene the census 
clause.131 Surely fulfilling a function that the legislature expects the 
courts to exercise expresses no disrespect for the political depart-
ments of the national government. Nor does the apportionment of 
United States representatives, as distinct from the issue of illegal im-
migration itself, implicate foreign relations so as to require govern-
mental unanimity on the issue. Representation for illegal aliens 
will have remote, if any, consequences for the flow of illegal 
immigration. 
The remaining possibility for declining to adjudicate the issue 
under the political question doctrine is a "textually demonstrable 
commitment" of the issue to another governmental department. Ar-
guably, the question of whether to include illegal aliens in the popu-
lation base lies within the purview of Congress. Article I, section 2, 
provides that "[t]he actual Enumeration shall be made within three 
Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, 
and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as 
they shall by Law direct." 132 This language would appear to give 
Congress wide discretion in directing the census.133 And the results 
of the census challenges in federal court support the notion that the 
courts are reluctant to interfere in this area. 134 Further, section 2 of 
the fourteenth amendment provides that representation shall be re-
duced for states that abridge voting rights for males over twenty-one 
years old. A New York resident tried to enforce this provision in the 
federal courts, but was denied relief. 135 Although the cases in the 
lower federal courts tend to be dismissed on standing grounds rather 
than disposed of as political questions, they do evince an overall dis-
comfort on the part of the courts with these questions. 136 
130. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
131. See note 4 supra. 
132. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
133. For a discussion of cases challenging the manner of enumeration, see Note, supra note 
l; Note, The Courts and the 1980 Census Challenges: Tailoring Rights To Fit Remedies, 15 U. 
MlcH. J. L. REF. 153 (1981). 
134. Id. 
135. See Sharrow v. Brown, 447 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 968 (1972); 
Saunders v. Wilkins, 152 F.2d 235 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 870 (1945), 
136. The Supreme Court has not been faced with the question of whether Congress has 
binding authority to decide issues arising under the census clause. On the issue of whether to 
include illegal aliens, the Court could decide (1) that it was within the prerogative of Congress, 
and its decision binding on the courts, (2) that congressional prerogative only applied to some 
portions of the clause, (3) that Congress had authority but had exceeded that authority, or 
(4) that the clause did not confer unreviewable authority on Congress and that its decision was 
acceptable (or unacceptable) on the merits. 
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On the other hand, the Court has intervened in some cases char-
acterized by stronger arguments for the legislature's prerogative.137 
The discussion of political questions in Baker v. Carr does not clarify 
whether one factor alone suffices to cause the Court to deny re-
view.138 The guarantee clause, thus far the only constitutional provi-
sion immune to judicial review,139 encompasses two factors: judicial 
incompetence and congressional authority to decide the issue.140 
Moreover, certain language in Baker v. Carr, consistent with the 
functional approach to political questions, suggests that the underly-
ing factors rather than the clause itself have led to this result, leaving 
open the possibility of future litigation under the guarantee clause.141 
Given this background, a finding that the census clause conferred 
authority upon Congress may not suffice to label the issue of whether 
to count illegal aliens in the census a political question. 
Because the Court has not had to decide whether census clause 
claims lie entirely within the purview of Congress, it is not confined 
by precedent and has a number of options.142 One such option is to 
decide that only portions of the clause fall within congressional dis-
cretion. This approach would enable the Court to avoid questions of 
the manner of enumeration, expressly assigned to Congress, 143 and, 
at the same time, to review a congressional interpretation of the 
phrase ''whole number of persons." 
The constitutional language itself suggests this distinction be-
tween congressional discretion-to administer the census and discre-
tion to count some "persons" and not others. The text commits only 
the manner of enumeration, and not the persons to be enumerated, 
to the prerogative of Congress. Such a distinction comports with the 
federal model of the census clause defended throughout this Note, 
for little likelihood exists that the states would have surrendered 
their sovereignty to a national government with unfettered discretion 
to manipulate the Great Compromise so precisely worked out to 
137. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
138. See Scharpf, supra note 128, at 566-67. Scharpfs discussion indicates that a variety of 
factors operate. 
139. See Henkin, supra note 128, at 607-10. 
140. See notes 127-28 supra and accompanying text. Some commentators say that the real 
problem with the guarantee clause is that hearing cases under the clause would provoke a 
head-on confrontation between the Court and other branches of government, see P. STRUM, 
supra note 152, at 35; cf. C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 67-99 (1969) (drawing a distinction between the authority to review acts of Congress and 
the authority to review acts of the states). Other commentators point out that the Court has 
decided several difficult issues and this factor alone cannot explain a decision to deny relief 
based on the political question doctrine. See Scharpf, supra note 128, at 566. 
141. 369 U.S. at 217-18. 
142. See, e.g., note 136 supra. 
143. See text at notes 132-33 supra. 
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overcome the profound doubts of large and small states alike. 144 
Even if the Court decided that the entire clause assigns authority 
to Congress, the question whether Congress has exceeded the au-
· thority granted remains. 145 A pure grant of authority, without more, 
may not preclude judicial review. 146 In this case, the Court would 
have to decide whether a decision by Congress to exclude illegal 
aliens from the apportionment base went beyond the authority con-
ferred. This approach necessarily goes to the merits of the decision. 
If the word "person" is ambiguous as applied to illegal aliens, Con-
gress could decide to exclude this group. If the word "person" is not 
ambiguous and expressly includes all people within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the state, as this Note argues, then Congress would 
have exceeded its grant of authority. In either case, the Supreme 
Court would review the decision. 
D. Arguments for Judicial Review 
Beyond the customary desire to see justice done on the merits, 
two particular concerns support judicial review of any congressional 
effort to exclude illegal aliens from the census. First, the census 
clause establishes a system for allocating representatives among the 
states. The clause amounts to an agreement among the states gov-
erning the distribution of political power among them. 147 The plan 
is fundamental to the structure of the government, and should re-
main stable regardless of whom a transient majority would exclude 
from representation. 148 Unless Congress decided to exclude aliens 
from the population base, changing existing procedures, the Court 
would be unlikely to interfere. The Court, however, should review 
any decision to change the formula for allocating representatives 
144. See notes 34-39 supra and accompanying text. By analogy, the framers were so con-
cerned that the arrangement in the Senate not be altered that they inserted a provision insulat-
ing the scheme even from constitutional amendment. A state cannot be given less than two 
senators without its consent. U.S. CONST., art. V. Surely they could not have intended that the 
scheme of representation designed for the House could be altered by something less than con-
stitutional amendment. 
145. Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution 
to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever 
authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, 
and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. 
396 U.S. at 211. See also Henkin, supra note 128, at 607-13. 
146. This relates to the argument that issues involving political questions contain more 
than one of the factors under consideration. See notes 138-41 supra and accompanying text. 
147. See Note, .Demography and .Distrust: Constitutional Issues of the Federal Census, 94 
HARV. L. REV. 841, 863 (1981). 
148. Arguably, so long as the majority that chose to abandon the current practice was 
elected under it, the resulting change would not abrogate the original compact agreed to by the 
states. This, however, ignores the interests of minority states, which may have entered the 
agreement because the Constitution guaranteed the stability of the system of allocating inter-
state representation. 
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among the states149 because the failure to do so would relegate the 
remedy for an abuse of power to the legislative majority responsible 
for it. 
Second, leaving the constitutional meaning of "person" to the 
discretionary definition of the legislature poses subtle but serious 
risks. The Constitution speaks repeatedly in terms of people and 
persons. Aside from the need for consistency, these provisions ought 
not to depend on the good will of political majorities, for it is pre-
cisely against majority abuse that they were meant to guard.150 
CONCLUSION 
The language and history of the census clause leave little doubt 
that the framers intended to include all persons in the census that 
apportions representatives. The intent to count persons reflects the 
conviction that the states as political entities, rather than individuals 
as citizens or voters, enjoy the right to representation in the national 
legislature. This territorial model of representation, viewing persons 
within the jurisdiction of the state as the measure, but not the source, 
of a state's entitlement to repre~entation, requires counting illegal 
aliens in the decennial census. Contemporary notions of equality in 
voting rights do not conflict with, or outweigh in constitutional im-
portance, the principles of federalism expressed in the census clause. 
The courts should not hesitate to defe~d those principles. 
149. See Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Society, 50 MARQ. L. REV. 575, 
579 (1967) ("One special charge of the Court· is responsibility for the framework of our 
government."). 
150. See text at note 31 supra. One obvious possible abuse concerns a decision by the 
political branches to legalize undocumented immigration for the purpose of gaining political 
advantage. So long as personhood for purposes of representation depends upon variable legal 
categories rather than upon enduring constitutional standards, the temptation of this sort of 
political exploitation will remain. 
